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There is a standard trade-off in compensation contracts between the provision of
incentives and insurance. We hypothesize that this trade-off influences the precision
with which firm performance is measured. We find that firm outcomes are measured
less precisely when chance plays a large role in these outcomes. Further, this preci-
sion is determined through the choice of shares outstanding. This has several novel
implications. Nominal stock prices can remain constant over time, and firms with un-
predictable cash flows should have more shares and lower stock price levels, all else
equal. We find evidence consistent with these implications.





The Olympic 100m dash is measured in hundredths of seconds even though timing technology
allows the runners to be timed to the ten thousandth. The precision of timing is purposely
limited because of the margin of error in the distance of the race. Differences of a few ten
thousandths of a second likely reflect random variation in lane length, not true differences
in ability or effort.
Similar issues may arise within the firm. The precision with which firm outcomes are
measured can be too coarse to adequately measure CEO performance or so fine such that the
measures reflect noise. Conceptually, one can think of a setting in which large differences in
firm cash flows are generated by the effort or ability of management, but smaller differences
are due to chance. Given the well known trade-off between the provision of incentives versus
insurance (e.g., Ho¨lmstrom, 1979), the optimal measure of firm performance should be precise
enough to reflect true managerial performance but not so precise that it rewards or penalizes
the manager for noise.
This issue may be particularly important in the context of CEO compensation. One
simple way for boards to control the precision with which they measure the performance
of the manager is to write contracts that treat specific ranges of firm outcomes the same.
Contracts written on per-share performance outcomes effectively do just that. For example,
the earnings-per-share (EPS) forecast for Microsoft’s Q3 2016 earnings was $0.68. With
roughly 8 billion shares outstanding, this EPS represents any total earnings between 5.40
and 5.48 billion dollars. In this case, each penny of EPS represents an 80 million dollar
range of earnings. Importantly, managers together with the board can choose this precision
1
by choosing the number of shares.1 If Microsoft had twice as many shares, each penny of
EPS would represent a range of earnings 160 million dollars wide.
CEO contracts often contain EPS-based provisions. Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal
(2005) find that EPS outcomes relative to analyst forecasts or past EPS is the single most
important managerial incentive target. Cheng, Harford, and Zhang (2015) find that almost
half of S&P 500 CEOs have annual incentive plans with explicit EPS targets. The importance
of EPS in contracts may influence the choice for shares. By choosing the number of shares,
the firm can create an EPS metric that reflects performance and not noise, resulting in more
efficient contracts.
In this paper, we test whether managers choose the number of shares to influence the
precision in firm metrics. We begin with a simple prediction about the level of per-share
metrics over time. If shares are chosen to maintain some level of precision in performance
metrics, then per-share values, such as EPS and stock prices, should remain at constant
nominal levels over time, all else equal. This is because in the U.S. EPS has always been
reported in a constant nominal unit, the penny, despite changes in its real value.
Prior literature provides support for the stability of nominal stock prices. Weld, Michaely,
Thaler, and Benartzi (2009) find that per-share stock price levels have not increased with
inflation; they coin this the “nominal price puzzle.” They conclude that the most likely
explanation is one of social norms. We do not rule this out. However, we show that EPS
levels have also remained relatively constant over time. We provide suggestive evidence that
at least part of the reason why per-share prices have remained constant in nominal terms is
1In practice, decisions regarding shares are made by managers in concert with the board. For the purposes
of exposition, we refer to both managers and boards as decision makers since agency conflicts are not the
focus of this paper.
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that per-share earnings have been reported in constant nominal terms.2
At the firm level, we expect that if a firm’s performance (e.g., cash flows) is a noisy
function of the manager’s decisions, that firm will have more shares than those whose per-
formance is less noisy. More shares will result in the firms with noisy cash flows having
EPS metrics that are less precise with respect to total earnings. We find that, in the cross
section, firms with the most noise in earnings have 3.5 times more shares than those with the
least. This relation is robust to a variety of different measures of noise in firm performance
outcomes and is not driven by differences in firm characteristics, such as size. We find that
it holds not just in the cross section, but also when shares are chosen at issuance. Firms
that IPO in industries with noisy cash flows tend to offer twice the number of shares at IPO
relative to firms in other industries, controlling for the amount of capital raised. Perhaps
not surprisingly, this variation in earnings noise also explains variation in share-price levels,
both in the cross-section and at IPO.
It is difficult to make causal inference from these relations alone. In order to determine
whether the number of shares is chosen to affect the precision of performance metrics, we
take an instrumental variables (IV) approach. We examine how precision changes (via ad-
justments to shares outstanding) as a response to shocks to the noise in a firm’s earnings
outcomes. Our instrument is plausibly exogenous drops in analyst coverage (e.g., Hong and
Kacperczyk (2010), Kelly and Ljungqvist (2012)). Sampling fewer analysts results in a nois-
ier EPS forecast, which results in noisier outcomes relative to that forecast. This is an ideal
instrument because the increase in the noise in earnings outcomes is the result of changes
2An ideal test to distinguish our explanation from one of social norms is to randomly switch to reporting
EPS in some other unit. For example, if we switched to reporting/contracting EPS in nickel increments, we
expect that stock price levels would increase five fold.
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in statistical sampling error of forecasts and not of changes in firm fundamentals.3 We
find that shocks to earnings noise cause managers to increase shares, reducing the precision
with which firm performance is measured. Specifically, a one standard deviation increase in
earnings noise results in a one standard deviation increase in the number of shares.
We find that managers respond to these shocks by changing shares via stock splits. There
is no evidence of share changes through other activities, such as SEOs or repurchases. This is
perhaps not surprising. Share issuances and repurchases may have other, higher order effects
on firms. Stock splits, on the other hand, are generally viewed as an accounting change that
should be relatively costless.4
We expect that some managers may care about precision more than others. For example,
a manager with high risk aversion might prefer less volatile outcomes and would therefore
choose to have many shares outstanding. Managers’ compensation contracts could also
provide incentives to manage precision. Empirical examination is made difficult, however,
because risk aversion is unobservable and variation in compensation contracts is not random,
e.g., contracts are likely jointly determined by firm and/or manager characteristics such as
risk aversion. To analyze cross sectional variation in incentives to manage precision, we
proxy for contractual incentives and examine if the response to exogenous noise shocks is
a function of these incentives. Cheng et al. (2015) show that a large portion of managers
have specific compensation components tied to EPS. We proxy for these incentives using
the text in proxy filings and compensation data.5 We find that the response to the noise
3At least two assumptions are implicit in this identification strategy. First, re-contracting is costly relative
to changing precision. Second, managers must care specifically about analysts’ expected EPS.
4Stock splits may affect other characteristics such as liquidity or the investor base. We attempt to control
for these variables in all our tests.
5This proxy is likely to be noisy. Bennett et al. (2015) show that, while contractual payoffs are often
functions of EPS, this can involve ranges, discrete jumps, and kinks at certain thresholds. Further, De Angelis
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shock among firms with managers that have these EPS contractual provisions is 1.5 times
the unconditional response.
Overall, our findings suggest that the choice for shares, and as a result, the level of per-
share metrics such as stock prices, relate to managerial incentives. Several papers connect
per-share metrics to firm fundamentals. For example, Brandt et al. (2010) relate low stock
price levels to high idiosyncratic volatility. They argue that low price levels induce retail
trading, and these trader clienteles cause the patterns in idiosyncratic volatility that we
observe. In contrast, our results suggest that causality may run in the opposite direction.
The idiosyncratic nature of a firm’s cash flows may induce the manager to choose many
shares, and as a result, the firm’s stock will trade at a low per-share price level. The relation
between unpredictable cash flows and share price may be related to several other empirical
findings. Rountree et al. (2008) show that cash flow volatility is related to firm value. Our
results may then help explain the findings of Baker et al. (2009) who show that stock returns
are a function of per-share stock price levels following stock splits.
Our results do not imply that the precision of performance metrics is the only driver of
stock splits. It is likely that other factors such as liquidity and optimal trading ranges also
influence the choice for shares. However, our results are consistent with one of the primary
reasons that managers give for stock splits, the desire to keep shares in some range (e.g.,
Baker and Gallagher, 1980). Only when stock prices are within some reasonable range are
EPS metrics representative of true firm performance rather than noise. While our findings
suggest that only a portion of variation in shares is explained by EPS incentives, the friction
we document can have surprisingly broad implications, such as the stability in aggregate
and Grinstein (2015) show that roughly 50% of compensation is not explicitly delineated in the contract.
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nominal price levels.
Our findings also help rationalize why metrics such as EPS receive such considerable
attention and are central to managerial compensation contracts (Graham et al., 2005). At
first glance, the use of such a measure is difficult to understand, given that the firm’s total
earnings are observable. However, total earnings may be too precise a measure to provide
information about managerial performance. Recent evidence in Bennett, Bettis, Gopalan,
and Milbourn (2015) shows that some firms overcome this problem by using ranges of total
earnings. We show that EPS can be calibrated through the choice of shares to reflect
performance, providing a rationale for compensation contracts that are written on EPS
instead of total earnings.6
We identify a causal effect of noise in cash flows on the choice for shares. However, it is
important to note that changes in shares (or stock price levels) may have feedback effects on
characteristics such as price volatility, liquidity, or earnings management incentives. There-
fore, our results suggest several avenues for future research. While we take the managers’
compensation structure as given and examine shocks to earnings noise, one opportunity for
future research may be to better understand if or how precision is incorporated into ex ante
contracting decisions. Furthermore, the connection between the choice for shares and the
precision of EPS relates to the vast literature on earnings management. Firms can avoid the
need to manage earnings by choosing a large number of shares. This highlights an important
source of endogeneity in earnings management research that has, to our knowledge, not been
addressed.
Our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses our data and variables. Section 3
6We discuss reasons why EPS might be used instead of ranges of total earnings in Section 3.
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presents our main findings related to share choice and earnings volatility. Section 4 discusses
the relation between return volatility, earnings volatility, and shares and Section 5 concludes.
2 Data
Our sample is compiled from four major databases. The primary data sample is gath-
ered from the quarterly CRSP/COMPUSTAT Merged database and combined with analyst
forecast data obtained from IBES. Our sample starts in 1984 since we require 12 previous
quarters of analyst forecasts in several of our tests. In later tests, we use brokerage closures
to identify exogenous drops in analyst coverage. Our last closure occurs in 2008 and we
require two years of data after each closure, thus we end our sample in 2010. We include
stock return data from CRSP. Only common stock with CRSP share code 10 or 11 are
included. We merge in institutional ownership obtained from the Thomson Reuters 13(f)
institutional holdings database. We use institutional ownership as a control given that stock
split outcomes, including abnormal returns and ex post ownership structure are associated
with levels of institutional ownership at the time of the split (Dennis and Strickland, 2003).
For a subset of tests, we require compensation data from ExecuComp.
To distinguish between changes in shares outstanding due to stock splits, repurchases, or
equity issuances, we use distribution codes from CRSP. Stock splits have a distribution code
equal to 5523. We assign a change in shares to a fiscal quarter if the CRSP payment date
(PAYDT) occurs after the prior earnings report date, but before the earnings report date as
reported in COMPUSTAT. If the earnings report date is missing, a share change is assigned
to a fiscal quarter if it occurs within the fiscal quarter begin and end dates.
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We gather details on CEOs’ compensation structures from annual proxy statements
(Schedule 14A) available on the SEC website. Online electronic versions of the statements
start in 1994. We match the proxy statements to firms in COMPUSTAT using match file
provided by Compustat for the sample period 1995-2010 (fiscal year).
To identify EPS based compensation, we analyze the text of annual reports and proxy
statements and search for specific sentences that contain the phrase “earnings per share”
or “EPS” and “target”, “bonus”, “incentive”, “award”, “threshold”, “goal”, “benchmark”,
“criteria”, “performance indicator”, or “performance metric.” We perform the search using
Natural Language Processing (NLP) which is a programming algorithm designed to accu-
rately interpret semantics (Bird et al. (2009)).7
A key prediction in our study centers on the link between the number of shares outstand-
ing and the extent to which the firm’s earnings reflect factors other than manager effort or
ability. For simplicity, we refer to the portion of earnings that reflect factors other than
effort or ability as “noise”. We create three measures of earnings noise. These proxies reflect
the tendency for the firm’s total earnings to differ from the expectation. If expectations of
firm outcomes include expectations of a manager’s ability or effort, volatility in outcomes
relative to expectations should be correlated with variation in earnings that is beyond the
manager’s control.
First, we calculate NoiseNaive as the standard deviation of total earnings over the past
12 quarters. This is likely correlated with the variation in earnings outside the manager’s
control, however it does not capture predictable, seasonal variation in the expectation. Sec-
7This allows us to perform sentence boundary disambiguation to distinguish between sentence ends and
abbreviations that use punctuation marks. Parsing statements using NLP and employing the strict require-
ment that the phrases must be contained in same sentence increases the likelihood of accurately identifying
compensation schemes that factor in EPS outcomes.
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ond, NoiseSeasonal is the standard deviation of the difference between actual total earnings
and a seasonally adjusted proxy for expected total earnings. Specifically, the expected total
earnings is total earnings from four quarters prior, plus the difference between the total
earnings four quarters and eight quarters before. This proxy captures the variance around
a time-varying mean using a simple forecast for the mean based on seasonality and prior
growth in earnings. Third, NoiseForecast is calculated as the standard deviation of the dif-
ference between total earnings and the median IBES forecasted total earnings over the past
12 quarters. We calculate median IBES forecasted earnings as the median EPS forecast
multiplied by shares outstanding. A benefit of this measure is that it relies on earnings
expectations formed by professional analysts in each period. A drawback is that it requires
data from IBES which reduces the sample.
Our usage of historical EPS and analysts’ forecasts as proxies for expectations is con-
sistent with Graham et al. (2005), who find that these are the two most important EPS
benchmarks. Results are robust to using various definitions of total earnings, including
Operating Income Before Depreciation as well as Income Before Extraordinary Items.
Table 1 presents the summary statistics of the sample. The key dependent variable used
in this study is shares outstanding (median = 23.55 million, mean = 83.85 million). EPS
has a median of $0.19 and mean of $0.20.
3 Results
Our analysis is motivated from the simple observation that per-share metrics are imprecise.
This imprecision exists because the firm outcome (e.g., earnings) is scaled by shares, but
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the result is not reported to infinite decimal places. Rather, per-share metrics are generally
rounded to the penny. Importantly, the precision of per-share metrics is determined by the
number of shares.
Each penny of EPS represents a range of total earnings that is shares
100
dollars wide. Mi-
crosoft had roughly 8 billion shares as of 2016.Q3. Therefore, each penny of EPS represents
an 80 million dollar range of total earnings. This imprecision means that Microsoft’s man-
agement will meet a given EPS forecast by producing total earnings within ± 40 million of
the amount of total earnings implied by the forecast (E[EPS] ∗ shares).






2∗E[EPS]%. The average firm in
our sample has EPS of $0.20. As such, the average firm will meet the forecast by producing
total earnings within ± 1
2∗0.20 = ±2.5% of expected total earnings. A doubling of shares
doubles the range of earnings that is represented by a penny’s worth of EPS. If the average
firm in our sample doubled the number of shares outstanding, the forecasted EPS would
mechanically drop to $0.10, and the relative range would increase to ±5%.
If, as in the Olympics, it is costly to measure outcomes “too precisely,” then firms may
choose to contract on per-share metrics and, at the same time, manage the precision by
adjusting the number of shares. Boards and managers could also contract on ranges of
earnings explicitly. While this solves one contracting problem, it does not address others.
For example, managers may also care about analyst coverage, media attention, or the market
response to earnings announcements, all of which may be sensitive to the precision with which
EPS are measured. As a result, managers may prefer to manage the precision of EPS even if
they are not compensated directly on EPS or are compensated on ranges of net income. The
analysis that follows examines whether the noise in earnings affects the choice for shares.
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3.1 The Relation Between Noise and Precision of EPS: The Nom-
inal Price Puzzle
Weld et al. (2009) document that nominal per-share stock prices have remained remarkably
constant across time (1933-2007). This is surprising given significant inflation over the same
period. The authors estimate that if real stock prices had remained constant over this
period, prices today would average around $450. Furthermore, the authors observe that
existing theories of stock splits fail to predict constant nominal share prices.
The relation between the number of shares and EPS precision is one potential explanation.
EPS has been, and continues to be, reported to the penny. This remains true despite the
penny declining in real value over time. All else equal, if managers have incentives to choose
the number of shares to maintain precision of EPS, then nominal stock price levels should
remain constant since EPS has been reported in constant nominal units. We would expect
nominal stock prices to increase with inflation only if the EPS unit of measurement also
increased with inflation.
To see this, consider a firm with 100 shares outstanding and total earnings distributed
uniformly between $0 and $10. Recall that the range of earnings that meets the forecast is
shares
100
dollars wide. In this case, E[EPS] = $0.05, and the firm meets the unbiased forecast if
it produces any total earnings in [4.5, 5.5), which occurs with probability 10%. Now assume
that the firm grows such that expected total earnings double, and so now earnings are
distributed uniformly between $0 and $20. All else equal (i.e., shares outstanding and P/E
ratios remain the same), E[EPS] doubles to $0.10 and the firm stock price also doubles.
However, the probability that the firm meets the forecast drops in half to 5% (any total
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earnings in [9.5, 10.5)). In order to maintain the same probability of meeting forecasts, the
firm must double the number of shares outstanding. After the share increase, the firm would
again meet the forecast with probability 10% (any total earnings in [9, 11)). This would
also return the stock price to its level prior to the growth. This highlights how incentives to
manage the precision of EPS can result in aggregate stock price levels that do not increase
directly with inflation.
In each quarter, we compute the median price-per-share and median earnings-per-share.
We plot these median values over time in Figure 1. Due to Compustat earnings data limita-
tions, we start the sample after 1970. Weld et al. (2009) argue that managers choose shares
outstanding to keep prices constant, whereas we argue that managers choose the number
of shares outstanding to keep the precision of EPS constant. The figure shows that prices
and earnings levels are strongly related. It is also evident that there is variation in both
price-per-share and earnings-per-share medians.
We briefly examine if the share-precision relation helps explain aggregate prices over
time. To do so, we test for a relation between aggregate prices and aggregate earnings
noise. We expect nominal prices to remain constant only if earnings noise has also remained
constant. If earnings noise changes over time, then we expect these changes to be negatively
correlated with nominal price levels. For example, if noise in earnings increases, we expect
that firms will increase shares and so nominal prices would drop. We compute correlations
between median price-per-share, median earnings-per-share, and median NoiseNaive over
time. Not surprisingly, median prices and median earnings per share are highly correlated at
0.68. The correlation between median EPS and median NoiseNaive is -0.38 and significant at
the 1% level. Median nominal prices are also negatively correlated with lagged NoiseNaive
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(ρ = −0.16, pvalue = 0.025).
We interpret these results cautiously. The relation between shares and earnings precision
may help us understand why stock prices have remained constant in nominal terms. However,
our hypothesis does not rule out a social norms explanation for the nominal price puzzle
as discussed in Weld et al. (2009). Rather, we view this evidence as motivation for our
subsequent analysis.
3.2 The Relation Between Noise and Precision of EPS: Firm Level
Evidence
At the firm level, our main cross-sectional hypothesis is that managers of firms with noisy
earnings will choose higher levels of shares outstanding. For a stable, predictable firm, small
deviations in earnings can be informative about effort or ability. In contrast, for a firm
with volatile, unpredictable earnings, small deviations may not be informative. Because it
is costly to reward or penalize managers for outcomes outside of their control, boards and
managers may optimally choose more precision (fewer shares) for stable, predictable firms,
and less precision (more shares) for noisy, unpredictable firms.
Again consider the firm with total earnings distributed uniformly between $0 and $10, 100
shares outstanding, and a resulting 10% probability of meeting an unbiased EPS forecast of
$0.05. Compare this to a second firm equal in all ways except it has higher earnings volatility
around the expected earnings. For example, a firm with total earnings uniformly distributed
from -$5 to $15 still has an expected earnings of $0.05, but with a larger variance. If this
firm also had 100 shares, it would meet the forecast only 5% of the time, half the probability
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of the less volatile firm. If instead the more volatile firm has 200 shares, it would meet
the forecast 10% of the time (any total earnings in [5, 7)). Therefore, all else equal (e.g.,
managers’ incentives to meet forecasts), we expect firms with more earnings noise to have a
higher number of shares outstanding.
Figure 2 summarizes shares (and corresponding stock price levels) as a function of
NoiseNaive. Panel A presents the median and 95% confidence interval for shares outstanding
in thousands across deciles of NoiseNaive as defined in Section 2. To compare firms with
similar earnings levels, in each quarter we first sort the sample into 20 groups based on the
level of total earnings. Then within each group, we sort into deciles based on NoiseNaive. We
find a strong association between shares outstanding and NoiseNaive. The top NoiseNaive
decile has 3.5 times as many shares outstanding than its bottom decile counterpart.
Panel B of Figure 2 plots median share prices as a function of NoiseNaive. As before,
in each quarter we first sort the sample into 20 groups based on the level of total earnings,
and then into deciles based on NoiseNaive. The figure displays a pattern consistent with the
shares outstanding patterns in Panel A. Firms with noisy earnings tend to have more shares
and as a result, lower stock price levels.
The relation between shares and earnings noise should hold not just with the equilibrium
level of shares in the pooled sorts, but also when managers choose the number of shares
at IPO. Since we do not have data on trailing earnings for firms at IPO, we test this by
examining whether firms issue more shares at IPO if they are in industries where earnings
are a noisy representation of the manager’s true performance relative to other industries.
In Figure 3 we present the median and 95% confidence interval of shares outstanding
(Panel A) and share price (Panel B) at IPO across deciles sorted on industry average
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NoiseNaive. Firms are first sorted each quarter into 20 groups based on market capital-
ization at IPO. Then within each group they are sorted into deciles based on Fama-French
49 industry average NoiseNaive.
These figures show a pattern that is consistent with evidence from Figure 2. At IPO,
firms in industries with highly volatile cash flows choose to issue more shares, even after
controlling for market capitalization. Panel B shows that this relation is also reflected in
share price. To our knowledge, this prediction is unique to a precision-based explanation
for the number of shares and contributes to our understanding of the variation in IPO price
levels.
While our sorts control for the overall level of firm earnings, they do not control for
differences in other firm characteristics that may relate to the number of shares. Table 2
presents regressions of the level of shares outstanding as a function of firm characteristics
measured in the prior quarter. Regression coefficients are standardized to represent standard
deviation effects in shares outstanding for a one standard deviation difference in a given
covariate. We examine the relation between the level of shares and the level of noise defined
using each of the three measures of earnings noise described in Section 2. All specifications
include controls for firm size (as measured by the log of the market capitalization), stock
illiquidity as defined in Amihud (2002), and the fraction of the firm owned by institutions.
Previous research on stock splits finds that these characteristics are associated with changes
in shares outstanding and, as such, are likely related to the level of shares outstanding.
Additional control variables are the market-to-book ratio, size squared, past stock return,
and return volatility. We also include firm fixed-effects in each regression to control for
time-invariant omitted variables. The key dependent variable is NoiseNaive,t−1 in column 1,
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NoiseSeasonal,t−1 in column 2, and NoiseForecast,t−1 in column 3.
The results in column 1 indicate a positive relation between NoiseNaive,t−1 and the num-
ber of shares outstanding. The coefficient estimate is both economically and statistically
significant. A firm with a value of NoiseNaive,t−1 one standard deviation above the mean
has 0.26 standard deviations more shares outstanding. The association is consistent across
the remaining columns. The effect is largest using NoiseForecast,t−1. One standard deviation
higher NoiseForecast,t−1 is associated with 0.41 standard deviations more shares.
These findings suggest that the association between the noise in the firm’s earnings and
the number of shares outstanding is economically large. Of the dependent variables, only
the controls for firm size and size squared have a larger association with shares outstanding.
In column 1, a one standard deviation change in firm size (size squared) is associated with
2.34 (−1.95) standard deviations more shares outstanding. The number of shares is posi-
tively related to net income and return volatility, and negatively related to market-to-book,
institutional ownership, illiquidity, and prior stock returns.
We also expect that changes in earnings noise should relate to changes in the number
of shares. Therefore, we estimate regressions of changes in shares on lagged changes in our
three proxies for the noise in earnings, controlling for lagged changes in firm characteristics.
In addition, we also include firm fixed effects to control for average changes within each firm
over the sample. We present the results of these regressions in Table 3.
Consistent with the prior evidence, the results in Table 3 show that the change in noise
is an important determinant of the change in shares outstanding. A one standard deviation
change in noise is associated with a 0.016 to 0.040 standard deviation changes in shares
outstanding. This effect is statistically significant at the 1% level and is still economically
16
large when compared to the coefficient magnitudes of the control variables.
The point estimate of the effect of changes in NoiseForecast on changes in shares is sub-
stantially larger than the estimated effect of increases in Net Income on changes in shares.
Prior literature finds that firms increase shares following earnings growth (e.g., Lakonishok
and Lev (1987), Asquith et al. (1989)) and that the market responds positively to these
increases. Our evidence supports a previously unidentified explanation for these empirical
relations. We expect that much of the within-firm variation in the number of shares occurs
simply because, on average, the magnitude of noise in earnings increases as the scale of the
firm grows. For a small firm, a swing in earnings of 1 million dollars is likely meaningful and
indicative of firm health and performance. For a large firm, this amount may be trivial and
may not be a relevant signal of the firm’s true health and performance, simply because it is
operating on a larger scale.
We offer a simple way to quantify precision relative to firm size. Recall that in Section 3
we show that the firm needs to produce total earnings within ± 1
2∗E[EPS]% of expected total
earnings to meet expected EPS. From this it is easy to see that as the firm’s earnings grow, the
denominator increases and the relative precision of the firm’s performance metrics increases.
If the number of shares stays constant, the firm’s realized earnings will need to be closer to
expectations in percentage terms, as the firm’s total earnings grows.
This simple connection between earnings growth and the relative size of the precision
of performance metrics leads to the prediction that managers will increase shares following
long term, permanent earnings growth. Furthermore, an increase in shares following growth
could serve as a signal to the market that the growth is permanent. Therefore, we offer a
potential new explanation for stock splits that is consistent with the empirical evidence in
17
the existing literature.
3.3 Exogenous Shocks to Noise
Overall our results suggest a robust relation between the noise in earnings and the choice
for the number of shares. While the results in Tables 2 and 3 help rule out the effects of
unobservable, time-invariant heterogeneity, they do not rule out the possibility that unob-
served time-varying changes in the firm may drive both the differences in earnings noise as
well as changes in shares. To identify a causal relation, we use plausibly exogenous variation
in earnings noise.
We use an instrumental variable approach for the first difference model described above.
Specifically, we instrument for the first difference of NoiseForecast by using exogenous drops in
analyst coverage. We use the same identification strategy approach as in Hong and Kacper-
czyk (2010), Kelly and Ljungqvist (2012), and Derrien and Kecske´s (2013) who use changes
in analyst coverage resulting from brokerage house mergers and closures. For example, when
brokerages merge, the combined house will often have more than one analyst covering a
particular stock. As brokerages reduce coverage to eliminate this duplication of effort, the
total number of analysts following certain stocks drops. We list the brokerage closures used
to identify these drops in coverage in Table 4. We include the date and coverage loss for
each specific event.
A drop in analyst coverage is a useful instrument for our purpose for two important
reasons. First, it acts as a shock to the noise in the forecast. After a drop in analyst coverage,
the consensus forecast will be noisier because it is formed over a smaller sampling of analysts.
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Stated differently, the variance of the sample mean increases when the sample size drops.
Second, firm fundamentals, in particular earnings, remain unchanged. Previous studies show
that drops in analyst coverage are unrelated to firm fundamentals (Hong and Kacperczyk
(2010)). Therefore, we use this change in the noise of the forecast as an exogenous shock to
NoiseForecast.
A firm can miss earnings because of unexpected poor performance. A firm can also miss
earnings because the consensus forecast did not equal the true expectation of the firm’s
earnings. The latter is more likely to occur the fewer analysts that are sampled. The fewer
analysts sampled, the larger is the standard error of the analysts’ consensus estimate, and
therefore it is more likely that the consensus forecast will differ meaningfully from the true
expectation. In such a case, firms are more likely to miss earnings forecasts due to noise in
the analysts forecast.
For example, recall the firm with total earnings distributed uniformly between $0 and
$10 and 100 shares outstanding. To see the effects of a drop in analyst coverage, we first
introduce noise in the forecast. Consider the case of one analyst whose per-share forecast
is unbiased but noisy. For simplicity, assume that the analyst will generate a forecast of
either $0.00, $0.05, or $0.10 with equal probability. In this case with a noisy forecast,
Pr(meet)= 1
15
, which is lower than the probability of meeting an unbiased, non-noisy forecast
(Pr(meet)= 1
10
). If the consensus forecast was the mean of two i.i.d. analysts, Pr(meet)= 4
45
.
With infinite analysts, Pr(meet)= 1
10
, equivalent to the case of an unbiased forecast with no
noise.8 The intuition behind this is simply that the chance of meeting an inaccurate forecast
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is lower than that of an accurate forecast, and inaccurate forecasts are more likely the fewer
analysts are sampled.
This example shows that the probability of meeting the forecast can drop as fewer analysts
are sampled and motivates our use of the analyst drops discussed earlier. While this is a
stylized example, the actual effect of analyst drops on forecast noise is an empirical question,
which we address below.
First, we document that exogenous drops in analyst coverage are relevant to forecast
noise. Specifically, we show that a drop in coverage results in an increase in the noise in
average earnings forecasts. Table 5 shows that the relation between forecast noise and analyst
coverage drops is economically and statistically significant at a variety of lags. In columns 1
through 4 we regress NoiseForecast on the number of analyst drops in a given period without
controls. The estimate in column 1 suggests that an analyst drop in a given quarter is
associated with a 10% of a standard deviation increase in the forecast noise in that quarter.
The next three columns show that this effect is persistent over several quarters, consistent
with the findings in Derrien and Kecske´s (2013). Columns 5 through 8 include the control
variables used in prior tables. The effect of the coverage drops on forecast noise is virtually
unchanged. These findings support the view that coverage drops are both economically
and statistically robust instruments for forecast noise. The instrument is both relevant to
earnings noise and arguably satisfies the exclusion restriction required for a good instrument.
In column 4 for example, the t-statistic on the instrument is > 5 and the F-statistic is > 40,
both well above the benchmarks established in Stock et al. (2002), alleviating concerns due
to weak instrument problems.
In Table 6 we use the analyst coverage drops to estimate the casual effect of forecast
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noise on changes in shares outstanding in reduced form (columns 1 through 4) and in an
IV specification (columns 5 through 8). The first four columns show that a drop in analyst
coverage is associated with an increase in shares outstanding of approximately 10% of a
standard deviation. This effect is robust statistically and to different lags of analyst coverage
drops.
Next, in columns 5 through 8 of Table 6 we present instrumental variables estimates
of the effect of NoiseForecast,t−1 on changes in shares at t. We estimate these regressions
using 2SLS where the first stage estimates are from columns 1, 5, 6, and 8, respectively,
of Table 5. The instruments for NoiseForecast,t−1 are contemporaneous coverage drops (at
time t − 1) in column 5 and 6, coverage drops one period prior to the noise measurement
(at t − 2) in column 7, and the cumulative coverage drops from t− 1 to t− 5 in column 8.
We find a significant positive relation across all specifications. Furthermore, a comparison
of the coefficient of interest across columns 5 and 6 shows that the impact of instrumented
NoiseForecast,t−1 is largely unaffected by the addition of firm controls. This supports the
view that the analyst coverage drops are exogenous with respect to the firm of interest.
These estimated effects are economically large. A one standard deviation increase in
instrumented NoiseForecast,t−1 is associated with a 1.0 to 1.2 standard deviation increase in
shares outstanding.9 The magnitudes are significant given that the standard deviation is
measured over the entire cross-sectional distribution of shares outstanding. This evidence
supports our main cross-sectional prediction that the amount of noise in performance causes
managers to choose the precision of those performance metrics.
9Note that this is consistent with the magnitudes implied by the reduced form specifications. The effect of
an analyst drop on noise (Table 5, column 1) is roughly the same the same as the reduced form estimates of
analyst drops on the change in shares (Table 6, column 1). This should result in a coefficient of approximately
one in the IV specification.
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The coefficient estimates on instrumented NoiseForecast,t−1 are larger compared to the
uninstrumented results in Table 3. There are at least two plausible reasons for this. First,
the instrumental variable approach should eliminate attenuation bias due to measurement
error in NoiseForecast,t−1. Second, variation in shares may be negatively correlated with an
unobserved variable that is itself positively correlated with earnings noise.10
In Table 7 we examine the source for the change in shares. In principle, precision will be
affected by any change in shares, whether due to share issuance, repurchases, or employee
option exercises. In column 1, we report results from all changes in shares for the sub-sample
where we have data on the source of share changes due to stock splits. In columns 2 and 3 we
break down the share changes into those due to stock splits and all other changes. The results
show that the overall effect documented in column 1 is driven by changes due to stock splits.
This is consistent with the view that these share changes are driven by concerns regarding
earnings noise. Capital structure changes, such as repurchases or issuance, do result in
changes to the number of shares, but it is unlikely that managers would choose this method
to manage the precision of EPS. Issuances and repurchases have effects that are arguably
more important than the change in shares. Rather, we expect managers to change shares
through stock splits, which are simple accounting changes that, absent frictions, should have
minimal real effects.
10For example, shares on average increase as firms grow. If larger firms mechanically draw more analyst
coverage (which should result in better forecasts) then our estimate of interest is biased downward under
OLS.
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3.4 Incentives to Manage Precision
We expect that the precision of performance metrics may be more important for some firms
than for others. For example, the performance of some firms may not be highly sensitive to
managerial effort and ability. As a result, these firms may choose shares for reasons unrelated
to the precision of performance metrics.
One simple way to distinguish firms that value optimally precise performance metrics is to
examine which managers have compensation or wealth that is sensitive to firm performance.
Managers may have both explicit and implicit incentives to meet EPS targets. Explicit
incentives based on EPS exist in some contracts for both cash bonuses and stock grants
(Cheng et al., 2015). Implicit EPS-based incentives may exist if the manager owns the firm’s
stock, because the stock price reacts to EPS outcomes.
Using three proxies for EPS-based incentives, we examine whether the effect of the noise
in earnings on shares is stronger for firms where managers are likely to have EPS-based
incentives. The existence or usage of these contractual features are not exogenous and are
likely to be jointly determined with the precision of performance metrics and other firm and
manager characteristics. Therefore, we examine if the response to shocks to NoiseForecast is
stronger in firms whose managers have compensation more sensitive to per-share performance
metrics.
Our first measure of explicit incentives is Pay Sensitivity which takes a value of one if
the manager receives a cash bonus or if the the firm’s SEC filings explicitly contain reference
to EPS (using textual analysis as described in Section 2) and zero otherwise. To proxy for
implicit incentives, our second measure, Ownership Sensitivity, equals one if the manager’s
23
ownership in the firm is above the sample median and zero if it is below. The third measure,
Hi Salary, takes a value of one if the proportion of the CEO’s salary to total compensation
is above the median. Managers with high fixed compensation should have relatively less
incentives (both explicit and implicit) to manage the precision of their performance metrics.
This is because they have less contractual ties to EPS (explicit) and receive less equity based
compensation (implicit). To test the importance of the incentive to manage precision, we
include an interaction between NoiseForecast and these measures of incentives.
In Table 8 we report estimates from a 2SLS specification similar to the specification used
in column 6 in Table 6. The results in Table 8 suggest that the effects we document are
driven largely by firms with explicit pay-based EPS incentives. Column 1 shows that the
instrumented interaction between NoiseForecast and Pay Sensitivity is positively and signif-
icantly related to changes due to stock splits. The estimate on instrumented NoiseForecast
alone is virtually zero. The results in column 2 show that this is not the case when we proxy
for ownership based incentives with Ownership Sensitivity. Therefore, stock price based in-
centives appear relatively less important in explaining our findings. While the coefficient
on the instrumented interaction between NoiseForecast and Ownership Sensitivity is positive,
the estimate is statistically insignificant. This is perhaps not surprising. It is possible that
higher precision leads to more stock price volatility because firms are less likely to meet EPS
forecasts. If managers have significant option compensation, they may prefer this volatility.
This offsetting incentive would mean such managers are less likely to split as a response to
changes in noise. In column 3, we examine whether the relation between shares and the noise
in forecasts is weaker when managers receive more fixed compensation. The point estimate
on the instrumented interaction is negative (p < 0.11%), consistent with this interpretation.
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4 Additional Implications: Share Price Levels and Firm
Fundamentals
Our results provide support for the view that the choice for shares is a function of the noise
in a firm’s underlying cash flows. This has a direct impact on the share price level of the
firm. A recent strand of literature links share price levels to firm outcomes, suggesting that
the price level drives, for example, idiosyncratic volatility (Brandt et al., 2010) and firm
value (Baker et al., 2009). In this section, we briefly discuss how our findings suggest that
fundamental cash flow volatility plays a role in understanding the effects of share price levels.
Brandt et al. (2010) document that lower priced stocks are associated with higher id-
iosyncratic return volatility. One interpretation of this relation is that low priced stocks
have higher idiosyncratic volatility because a low share price attracts a retail trader cliente`le
Brandt et al. (2010) find evidence consistent with this interpretation.
Our results suggest that the relation between idiosyncratic volatility and share price may
partially be explained by managers’ EPS-based incentives, and that causality may also run
in the opposite direction. Our hypothesis is that noisy earnings will cause firms to choose
high levels of shares, resulting in low share prices. To the extent that earnings noise and
idiosyncratic volatility are correlated, we would expect to see similar empirical outcomes as
in Brandt et al. (2010), but through a different channel.
Figure 4 reports the average noise in earnings (left axis) and average idiosyncratic volatil-
ity (right axis) across deciles sorted on stock price each quarter. Not surprisingly, earnings
noise and idiosyncratic volatility are highly correlated. The figure shows that both are de-
creasing in share price. Idiosyncratic volatility is more that twice as large for stocks in the
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low price decile compared to the high price decile, while earnings noise is nearly 50% higher
in the low price decile relative to the high price decile.11
Baker et al. (2009) show that low priced stocks are associated with lower future returns
when stock split activity is high, which they argue results from price based catering. We
show that stock splits are likely to occur when the noise in cash flows increases. In addition,
Rountree et al. (2008) show that higher cash flow volatility results in lower valuations. If
managers are adjusting shares (and as a result price levels) directly as a function of cash
flow volatility, then we expect lower share prices to relate to value. It is possible that the
relation documented in Baker et al. (2009) is due, in part, to fundamental changes in cash
flows driving both valuation and stock price level differences.
Our overall findings in the paper suggest that retail trading and catering explanations for
relations between fundamentals and share price levels may only be part of the picture. These
relations may, in part, be a side-effect of managers choosing shares to affect the precision of
performance metrics. This highlights a potential implication of firms’ endogenous adjustment
of performance metric precision that is beyond financial reporting and EPS outcomes.
5 Conclusion
Standard theory suggests a trade-off when choosing the precision with which to measure firm
performance. The metric should be precise enough such that it provides relevant information
regarding management’s effort and ability, but not so precise that it reflects random variation.
11To ensure that these patterns are not due to differences in net income, we adjusted for net income by
first sorting the sample firms into 50 groups based on net income each quarter, and then sorting into deciles
based on stock price.
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We find evidence consistent with the view that managers actively choose the precision of a
particular performance measure, EPS, in such a way that is consistent with noise in their
earnings and their incentives.
We document several important implications of this. Our results provide a new expla-
nation for stock splits that is consistent with several empirical regularities in the literature.
We also explain why firms in some industries tend to IPO at lower share prices than oth-
ers and why nominal share prices have remained relatively stable over time. Moreover, our
findings suggest potential links between firm fundamentals, such as idiosyncratic volatility
and returns, to share price levels.
Overall, our results suggest that the precision of performance metrics arises endogenously
and provide a new explanation for the popularity of per-share metrics. Our findings open
the door for future research to better understand the optimal contract and how it may relate
to the number of shares. Furthermore, our conclusions have direct implications for research
on analysts’ forecast errors, and more broadly, the literature on earnings management.
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Figure 1: Median Nominal Price-per-share and Earnings-per-share, 1971-2015.
This figure shows median nominal price-per-share and earnings-per-share over 1971-2015 for all
U.S. firms with price and earnings data in Compustat.
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Figure 2: Median Shares Outstanding and Share Price across NoiseNaive Deciles
This figure presents median shares outstanding(share price) in Panel A(Panel B) across deciles
sorted on NoiseNaive. In each quarter, firms are first sorted into 20 groups on Net Income then
within each group they are sorted into deciles on NoiseNaive. NoiseNaive is the standard deviation
of the previous 12 quarters of net income. For each decile, we plot the median shares outstanding
or share price and the 95% confidence interval. The sample period is 1984-2010.
Panel A. Shares Outstanding across Noise Naive  Deciles




























Figure 3: Shares Outstanding and Share Price at IPO
This figure presents median shares outstanding(share price) in Panel A(Panel B) at IPO across
deciles sorted on industry average NoiseNaive. In each quarter, firms are first sorted into 20 groups
on Size and then within each group they are sorted into deciles on Fama-French 49 industry average
NoiseNaive. NoiseNaive is the standard deviation of the previous 12 quarters of net income. For
each decile, we plot the median shares outstanding or share price and the 95% confidence interval.
The sample period is 1984-2010. IPO_SharesPrice
Panel A. Shares Outstanding at IPO across Industry Noise Naive Deciles
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Figure 4: Average NoiseNaive and Idiosyncratic Volatility Across Share Price Deciles
This figure presents average NoiseNaive (left axis) and average idiosyncratic return volatility (right
axis) across deciles sorted on share price at the end of each quarter. In each quarter, firms are
first sorted into 50 groups on Net Income and then within each group they are sorted into deciles
on stock price. NoiseNaive is the standard deviation of the previous 12 quarters of net income.
Idiosyncratic volatility is the idiosyncratic risk of stock returns from a market model over the past




























Table 1: Summary Statistics
Shares outstanding (millions) is the total number of shares outstanding (CRSP) at the end of the quarter. EPS is the primary
earnings per share from Compustat. Net Income is from Compustat at quarter end. NoiseNaive is the standard deviation of
net income over the past 12 qtrs. NoiseSeasonal is the standard deviation of seasonally adjusted net income over the past 12
qtrs. NoiseForecast is the standard deviation of net income minus the consensus IBES median forecast of net income over the
previous 12 qtrs. Return Volatility is the standard deviation of daily stock returns over the past 90 days. Size is the total
market capitalization in millions at the quarter end. Institutional Ownership is the fraction of shares outstanding owned by
institutions per Thomson Reuters 13(f). Number of Analysts is the number of analysts covering the stock during the quarter.
Annual Stock Return is the past 12 month stock return. Illiquidity is the log of the illiquidity ratio defined in Amihud (2002)
and calculated over the past year. Split ratio is the ratio to adjust shares at stock split announcement. Share price is the stock
price at the end of the quarter. Age is the years since IPO. The sample is from 1984-2010.
Variable Mean P25 Median P75 STD
Shares Outstanding (millions) 83.85 10.16 23.55 56.75 346.78
EPS 0.20 -0.02 0.19 0.47 1.19
Share Price 22.68 7.70 17.25 30.75 24.94
NoiseNaive 51.48 1.59 5.23 20.57 347.76
NoiseSeasonal 40.38 1.47 4.75 18.20 264.06
NoiseForecast 32.04 0.58 2.38 11.01 250.83
Net Income 34.48 -0.30 3.05 17.65 388.95
Return Volatility (%) 3.30 1.82 2.68 4.04 2.35
Size 2766 95 338 1316 13069
Institutional Ownership (%) 47.97 24.34 46.85 70.22 27.78
Number of Analysts 4.24 1 3 5 4.35
Annual Stock Return (%) 15.74 -21.13 5.96 34.78 81.12
Illiquidity -1.05 -2.90 -0.98 0.80 2.57
Split Ratio 1.64 1.50 1.50 2.00 0.68
Age 16.1 5.5 11.2 21.2 15.2
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Table 2: The Relation Between Noise and the Level of Shares Outstanding
This table presents regressions of the level of shares outstanding as a function of firm characteristics. Shares outstanding is
measured as the total number of shares outstanding (in thousands) from CRSP at the end of the quarter. NoiseNaive is the
standard deviation of net income over the previous 12 quarters. NoiseSeasonal is the standard deviation of the the difference
between actual earnings and an expectation of earnings based on the earnings from 4 quarters prior plus the difference between
the earnings 4 quarters and 8 quarters prior. NoiseForecast is the standard deviation of the the difference between actual
earnings and median IBES forecast of earnings. Market to Book is total market equity plus the book value of total debt divided
by total assets. Net Income is from Compustat at quarter end. Size is the log of total market capitalization in millions at the
quarter end. Institutional ownership is percent ownership of all institutions. Return Volatility is the standard deviation of daily
stock returns over the prior 90 days. Annual Return is the past 12 month stock return. Illiquidity is defined in Amihud (2002)
and calculated over the previous 90 days. Firm and year effects are included in all specifications. All variables are standardized









Market to Bookt−1 -0.045∗∗∗ -0.044∗∗∗ -0.048∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Net Incomet−1 0.096∗∗∗ 0.098∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)





Sizet−1 -1.954∗∗∗ -1.966∗∗∗ -1.742∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Annual Returnt−1 -0.055∗∗∗ -0.059∗∗∗ -0.045∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Illiquidityt−1 -0.153∗∗∗ -0.161∗∗∗ -0.137∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Return Volatilityt−1 0.021∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Firm Effects Y Y Y
Year Effects Y Y Y
N 267495 267495 267495
R2 0.584 0.576 0.599
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Table 3: Changes in Noise and Changes in Shares Outstanding
This table presents regressions of changes in shares outstanding as a function of changes in firm characteristics. Shares out-
standing is measured as the total number of shares outstanding (thousands) from CRSP at the end of the quarter. NoiseNaive
is the standard deviation of Net Income over the previous 12 quarters. NoiseSeasonal is the standard deviation of the the dif-
ference between actual earnings and an expectation of earnings based on the earnings from 4 quarters prior plus the difference
between the earnings 4 quarters and 8 quarters prior. NoiseForecast is the standard deviation of the the difference between
actual earnings and median IBES forecast of earnings. Market to Book is total market equity plus the book value of total debt
divided by total assets. Net Income is from Compustat at quarter end. Size is the log of total market capitalization in millions
at the quarter end. Institutional ownership is percent ownership of all institutions. Return Volatility is the standard deviation
of daily stock returns over the prior 90 days. Illiquidity is defined in Amihud (2002) and calculated over the previous 90 days.
Firm and year effects are included in all specifications. All variables are standardized for interpretation. We report standard
errors clustered by firm. Significance is noted by *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.








∆ Market to Bookt−1 0.032∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
∆ Net Incomet−1 0.007∗∗ 0.007∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)





∆ Sizet−1 0.078∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
∆ Annual Returnt−1 -0.021∗∗∗ -0.021∗∗∗ -0.020∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
∆ Illiquidityt−1 0.005 0.005 0.005
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
∆ Return Volatilityt−1 0.003 0.004 0.004
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Firm Effects Y Y Y
Year Effects Y Y Y
N 251233 251233 251233
R2 0.024 0.024 0.025
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Table 4: List of Brokerage Closures
This table presents the sample of brokerage closures from Hong and Kacperczyk (2010) and Kelly and Ljungqvist (2012). After
matching with the IBES database, we have a total of 49 brokerage closures. Target or closure is the name of the brokerage
house that was a target of a merger or closed its offices. Event date is the month of the merger or closure. The acquirer is the
acquiring brokerage if it was a merger. Coverage loss equals the number of stocks that experienced a loss in analyst coverage
due to the closure.
Target or Closure Event Date Acquirer Coverage Loss
Dean Witter Reynolds May 1997 Morgan Stanley 172
Salomon Brothers Nov 1997 Smith Barney 197
Principal Financial Securities Jan 1998 Everen Capital 18
Jensen Securities Feb 1998 D.A. Davidson 3
Wessels Arnold & Henderson Apr 1998 Dain Rauscher 54
Everen Capital Oct 1999 First Union 44
Schroder Wertheim Apr 2000 Salomon Smith Barney 131
Wit Capital May 2000 Soundview 18
Brown Brothers Harriman Jun 2000 187
JC Bradford Jun 2000 Painewebber 20
Donaldson Lufkin & Jenrette Oct 2000 Credit Suisse First Boston 325
George K Baum Oct 2000 98
Chase Manhattan Dec 2000 J.P. Morgan 64
Painewebber Dec 2000 Ubs Warburg Dillon Read 153
R.J. Steichen Dec 2000 Miller Johnson & Kuehn 2
Hambrecht & Quist Jan 2001 J.P. Morgan Chase 141
Wasserstein Perella Feb 2001 Dresdner Bank 13
ING Financial Markets May 2001 287
Emerald Research Jul 2001 18
Robinson-Humphrey Aug 2001 Suntrust Equitable Securities 6
Josephthal Lyon & Ross Sep 2001 Fahnestock 2
Conning & Co Oct 2001 24
Wachovia Securities Oct 2001 First Union 56
Hoak, Breedlove, Wesneski Nov 2001 44
Tucker Anthony Sutro Nov 2001 Rbc Dain Rauscher 27
Sutro & Co Jan 2002 Rbc Dain Rauscher 7
ABN Amro Apr 2002 491
Frost Securities Jul 2002 68
Robertson Stephens Jul 2002 410
Vestigo-Fidelity Aug 2002 22
Commerce Capital Markets Apr 2003 44
The Chapman Company Jul 2003 10
Montauk Capital Markets Feb 2004 3
Schwab Soundview Oct 2004 Ubs Warburg Dillon Read 74
Parker/Hunter Mar 2005 Janney Montgomery Scott 5
Tradition Asiel Securities Mar 2005 58
IRG Research Jun 2005 84
Wells Fargo Securities Aug 2005 146
Advest Dec 2005 Merrill Lynch 11
Legg Mason Wood Walker Dec 2005 Citigroup 73
Moors & Cabot Sep 2006 68
Petrie Parkman Dec 2006 Merrill Lynch 22
Ryan Beck & Co Jan 2007 Stifel Financial 31
Cohen Brothers Apr 2007 61
Prudential Equity Group Jun 2007 343
Cochran, Caronia Securities Sep 2007 Fox-Pitt Kelton 32
A.G. Edwards & Sons Oct 2007 Wachovia Securities 172
Nollenberger Nov 2007 80
CIBC World Markets Jan 2008 Fahnestock 104
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Table 5: Analyst Coverage Drops and Changes in Noise
This table presents regressions of changes in Noise on drops in analyst coverage due to brokerage closures. Noise is the
standard deviation of the difference between actual earnings and median IBES forecast of earnings. Analyst Drop equals the
total number of analysts dropped in the quarter due to brokerage house closures and/or mergers. Market to Book is total market
equity plus the book value of total debt divided by total assets. Net Income is from Compustat at quarter end. Size is the log
of total market capitalization in millions at the quarter end. Institutional ownership is percent ownership of all institutions.
Return Volatility is the standard deviation of daily stock returns over the prior 90 days. Annual Return is the past 12 month
stock return. Illiquidity is defined in Amihud (2002) and calculated over the previous 90 days. Year effects are included in all
specifications. All variables are standardized for interpretation. We report standard errors clustered by firm. Significance is
noted by *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
∆ Noise ∆ Noise ∆ Noise ∆ Noise ∆ Noise ∆ Noise ∆ Noise ∆ Noise
Analyst Drop 0.101∗∗∗ 0.097∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01)
Analyst Dropt−1 0.096∗∗∗ 0.098∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01)
Analyst Dropt−4 0.075∗∗∗ 0.075∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01)
Analyst Dropt,t−4 0.031∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00)
∆ Market to Bookt−1 0.007∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
∆ Net Incomet−1 -0.051∗∗∗ -0.051∗∗∗ -0.052∗∗∗ -0.052∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
∆ Institutional Ownershipt−1 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
∆ Size2t−1 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
∆ Sizet−1 0.010∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
∆ Annual Returnt−1 -0.030∗∗∗ -0.031∗∗∗ -0.031∗∗∗ -0.031∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
∆ Illiquidityt−1 -0.011∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗ -0.012∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
∆ Return Volatilityt−1 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Year Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
N 252171 253092 252684 242376 229515 230294 229768 220578
R2 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.011 0.010 0.010 0.010



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 7: Changes in Noise and Splits Versus Other Share Changes
This table presents 2SLS regression models of changes in shares outstanding as a function of instrumented NoiseForecast,t−1
and changes in firm characteristics. Shares outstanding is measured as the total number of shares outstanding (thousands) from
CRSP at the end of the quarter. NoiseForecast,t−1 is is the standard deviation of the the difference between actual earnings
and median IBES forecast of earnings and is instrumented for using drops in analyst coverage. In column 1 the dependent
variable is the total change in shares. In column 2 the dependent variable is the change in shares due to splits as the dependent
variable. In column 3 the dependent variable is the change in shares that results from reasons other than splits (e.g. repurchases
and issuances). Market to Book is total market equity plus the book value of total debt divided by total assets. Net Income
is from Compustat at quarter end. Market Cap is the total market capitalization in millions at the quarter end. Institutional
ownership is percent ownership of all institutions. Return Volatility is the standard deviation of daily stock returns over the
prior 90 days. Annual Return is the past 12 month stock return. Illiquidity is defined in Amihud (2002) and calculated over
the previous 90 days. Year effects are included in all specifications. All variables are standardized for interpretation. We report
standard errors clustered by firm. Significance is noted by *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
∆ Shares ∆ Shares ∆ Shares
Outstanding Outstanding from Outstanding not
Splits from Splits
∆̂NoiseForecast,t−1 0.782∗∗∗ 1.022∗∗∗ -0.109
(0.19) (0.27) (0.09)
∆ Market to Bookt−1 -0.000 0.048∗∗∗ 0.137∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
∆ Net Incomet−1 0.053∗∗∗ 0.080∗∗∗ 0.006
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01)





∆ Sizet−1 0.102∗∗∗ 0.000 -0.224∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
∆ Annual Returnt−1 -0.006 0.025∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
∆ Illiquidityt−1 0.010∗ 0.011∗∗∗ -0.033∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
∆ Return Volatilityt−1 0.004 0.013∗∗∗ -0.001
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
N 183787 183787 183787
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Table 8: Changes in Shares and Managerial Incentives
This table presents 2SLS regression models of changes in shares outstanding due to splits as a function of changes in firm and
manager characteristics. In these specifications, ∆ NoiseForecast,t−1 is instrumented for using exogenous changes in analyst
coverage. Interactions with ∆ NoiseForecast,t−1 are instrumented for by using exogenous changes in analyst coverage times
the interaction term. Pay Sensitivity equals one if the manager receives a cash bonus or if the the firm’s SEC filings explicitly
contain reference to EPS and zero otherwise. Ownership Sensitivity equals one if the manager’s ownership in the firm is above
the sample median and zero if it is below. Hi Salary equals one if the proportion of the CEO’s salary to total compensation
is above the median, zero otherwise. Shares outstanding is measured as the total number of shares outstanding (in thousands)
from CRSP at the end of the quarter. Market to Book is total market equity plus the book value of total debt divided by
total assets. Net income is from Compustat at quarter end. Size is the log of total market capitalization in millions at the
quarter end. Institutional ownership is percent ownership of all institutions. Return Volatility is the standard deviation of
daily stock returns over the prior 90 days. Annual Return is the past 12 month stock return. Illiquidity is defined in Amihud
(2002) and calculated over the previous 90 days. Year effects are included in all specifications. All variables are standardized
for interpretation. We report standard errors clustered by firm. Significance is noted by *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
∆ Shares ∆ Shares ∆ Shares
from Splits from Splits from Splits




















∆ Market to Bookt−1 0.145∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗ 0.143∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
∆ Net Incomet−1 0.124∗∗∗ 0.123∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
∆ Institutional Ownershipt−1 0.066∗∗∗ 0.068∗∗∗ 0.065∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
∆ Size2t−1 -0.017 -0.029
∗ -0.025
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
∆ Sizet−1 -0.023 -0.024 -0.021
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
∆ Annual Returnt−1 0.050∗∗ 0.061∗∗ 0.055∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
∆ Illiquidityt−1 0.096∗ 0.120∗ 0.127∗
(0.05) (0.07) (0.07)
∆ Return Volatilityt−1 0.026∗∗ 0.023∗ 0.021
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Year Effects Y Y Y
N 88537 88152 88537
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